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The contention of this paper is that contemporary sociology has
been misled into relying on tests of significance to the virtual exclusion
of measures of association. A glance at any recent issue of the American
Sociological Review will show that the bulk of the research is analyzed
by the computation and interpretation of levels of significance.
Further, even if a measure of association is computed it is usually
analyzed in terms of a test of significance rather than in terms of its
own numerical value. This reliance means that our discipline annually
discovers and reaffirms the probable existence of many interesting
relationships; however, it also means that the strengths of these
relationships are not known. What are the consequences of this
methodological policy? Gouldner states that there is a
fairly widespread tendency among sociologists ... to rest content
with a demonstration that some sociological variable "makes a
difference." If a variable can. be shown to control even the smallest
proportion of the variance in a problematic pattern, it is all too
readily regarded as a memorable contribution to sociology and all
too ceremoniously ushered into its theoretical hall of fame....
Unless sustained interest is manifested in the degree of variance
which a variable controls, and, unless, further, we can identify
sociological variables that certifiably control substantial proportions
of variance in specified patterns of human behavior, sociology will
remain scientifically immature and practically ineffectual.
One consequence of this policy is to help sociology find a large body of
impotent relationships. To the extent that sociological theory is based
on and includes weak relationships, it must itself be weak. If such
impotency is indeed a consequence of our contemporary methodology,
then one must conclude that it should be either modified or
abandoned.
Has our methodology led us to accept and dwell upon weak
relationships? Is a "significant" result good evidence that a researcher
has indeed stumbled upon a reasonably strong relationship? After all, if
it had not been significant this would strongly suggest that there is no
relationship. Hence, tests of significance divide relationships objectively
into the two categories of "some relationship" and "no relationship".
Unfortunately, "some" might mean either a very strong or a very weak
relationship, so that this by no means settles the question. The
remainder of the paper will approach this question from two directions.
First, the logic behind tests of significance will be examined and it will
be shown that there is no necessary relationship between level of
significance and strength of relationship. Second, application of a
standardized measure of the strength of recently published "signifi-
cant" relationships reveals that tests of significance discover relation-
ships which are distinctly weak.
An Evaluation of Statistical Risk
The probability calculated in tests of significance is a function of two
independent factors - the determinancy of the relationship and the
number of observations. Consequently, the inference that a "signifi-
cant" relationship exists between two variables may arise from the
combination of a very weak relationship and a large sample, a very
strong relationship and a small sample, or, of course, a strong
relationship and a large sample. On the other hand, the inference that a
significant relationship does not exist between two variables may arise
from a strong relationship in a too small sample, a weak relationship in
a sample not quite large enough, or, of course, a weak relationship in a
small sample.
Everyone knows these facts, yet, they are widely ignored. We always
conclude that our hypothesis is strongly confirmed if we obtain a 1 per
cent level of significance, and conclude that a 10 per cent level is reason
for emphatically rejecting our hypothesis. Yet, these conclusions simply
are not justified. What is justified is the conclusion that there is at least
some relationship carrying only a small risk in the one case, and, by
convention, too large a risk in the other. In fact, the hypothesis may
have received very strong support in the 10 per cent risk case - that is,
the data may indicate that there is a very high degree of determinancy
- but the sample size may be so small that the finding must be
adjudged unreliable, and the indicated conclusion risky. On the other
hand, the hypothesis may have received only the weakest support in the
72
1 per cent case, a~ indicated by little determinancy, but the sample size
may be so excessively large - not unusual in sociological research -
that the trivial relationship is highly reliable.
In other words, the fact that there are two independent factors
which determine the level of significance in a given case has been
ignored, the level of significance being equated with the determinancy
of relationship. As a result, though we have seemed to have been piling
up an impressive amount of knowledge about the determinants of
various social patterns, it is possible that all we have piled up is a
collection of weak relationships imbedded in huge samples.
But, some hardy optimist may object, that in spite of our
pre-occupation with tests of significance and our erroneous equation of
significance level with determinancy, it is quite likely that many, even
most, of our findings point to strong and consequently important
relationships. After all, determinancy is one of the components of
significance level. In order to evaluate our optimistic friend's sug-
gestion, let us develop a standardized yardstick to measure the strength
of the relationship between two variables. We may, then, apply this to
the "significant" findings reported in our journal articles in recent years
and discover how important these significant findings actually are. First
let us imagine a yardstick which varies between zero and one
corresponding to the strength of the relationship between two variables.
Further, suppose that this yardstick is a ratio scale so that a relationship
whose determinancy is .25 is only half as strong as one that is .50. This
yar~stick which we shall dub the "coefficient of determinancy", may
be Interpreted as measuring the percentage of variation in one variable
which is predictable from another variable. In other words this
yardstick tells us the percentage of one variable which m~y be
statistically determined by another variable.
Next let us decide upon what we consider to be a "strong"
relationship ?n this scale. Sociologists, when asked this question, give
answers ranging anywhere from 30 per cent to as high as 90 per cent
determinancy. The modal value seems to be around 50 per cent. And,
one must admit that this would, indeed, be a strong relationship.
However, since our yardstick is the square of the correlation coefficient
(under those conditions for which correlations are appropriate), some
will ar~e for lowering of this figure. A correlation of .30, and, thus, a
yardstick value of 9 per cent is considered respectable. It seems
reasonable to argue that this is the very lowest level at which we might
consider a relationship to have even tolerable importance. Let us
assume, ·then, that a relationship which determines 10 per cent of the
variation is. weak but tolerable, that a relationship that determines 30
per cent is quite good, and that one that determines 50 per cent is very
good.
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Let us apply our yardstick to some relationships, which have been
subjected to statistical manipulation and reported as significant. Table I
reports the results of just such an examination of 99 tests. of
significance reported in the first three issues of the 1961 American
Sociological Review. The yardstick may be directly applied to any data
in a form usable by the major statistical tests, Chi-square, t-test, analysis
of variance, and correlation analysis. For purposes of comparison the
results are reported separately for each type of test.
We find that 41 Chi-squares have found significant relationships
which determine only 8 per cent of the data. Furthermore, the single
highest one accounts for only 25 per cent of the data. That is, the single
strongest relationship discovered by Chi-square analysis left over 75 per
cent of the significant datum unexplained. Perhaps, the results from
most of this research, say the 66 per cent which did not explain at least
10 per cent of the data, should have led to a rejection of the theories
and hypotheses presented in the articles on the grounds that they are so
weak that they are almost completely unimportant.
Research analyzed by other popular methods seems to fare only
slightly better. Nine analyses of variance account for only 16 per cent
of the variation. Of the nine, however, only one third do not meet the
minimal level of 10 per cent. The 49 correlation coefficients single out
variables which explain on the average under 12 per cent of the
variation. In this case over half do not attain the minimal level.
Since all of these figures are based on a ratio scale with the same
meaning, we can compute an overall average of the strength of
relationships which have been discovered in these statistically signifi-
cant results. This computation shows that all of the research reported in
the first half of 1961, and which has been adjudged statistically
significant, accounts for less than 11 per cent of the variation in the
social patterns studied. It is difficult not to draw the same conclusion
for this data as was drawn for the Chi-square tests; much of it should
have been used to conclude that the theories and hypotheses under
consideration were of very little, or no importance.
Before concluding that tests of significance by themselves are totally
insufficient, the cautious will want to examine the data still further.
Our optimist might suggest that those relationships singled out by a
high significance level may be stronger than those singled out by a low
significance level, thus allowing us to differentiate between these
relationships. This suggestion may be easily checked by comparing the
strength of relationships judged significant at each of the acceptable
levels "to discover if their strengths vary systematically as a function of
significance. Table II indicates that they do not. While. the average
relationship significant at the .1 per cent level determines about 13 per
cent of the data, the average relationship significant at the 5 per cent
level determines 15 per cent. Furthermore, those at the 1 per cent level
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determine only 4 per cent and those at the 2 per cent level 7 per cent of
the data. The fact that our yardstick is not related to level of
significance is simply a further illustration that significance is highly
dependent upon sample size.
Conclusions
The foregoing discussion lends force to Gouldner's criticism of our
contemporary methodology. Tests of significance lump the weak,
moderate and strong relationships together in one "significant" basket,
having only the virtue of excluding the nullest of null relationships. The
coefficient of determinancy appears to be a much better measure of
relatedness. Nevertheless, there are several objections which may be
raised to using the coefficient of determinancy.
While it may be plausible to argue that the low level of the average
determinancy in the significant relationships studied in this paper is due
to the fairly primitive stage of our scientific development, the
indiscriminate lumping of weak and strong relationships cannot be so
excused. After all, some of the relationships included in average are
quite high, at least a few over 30 per cent. Surely it is of great
importance to be able to distinguish these relationships from the quite
numerous ones which determine less than 2 per cent.
It may also be plausible to argue that merely citing the coefficient of
determinancy does not allow us to make a "decision" about our
relationship; there is no criterion to guide us. Indeed, this is one
seductive property of tests of significance: you either accept or reject
the hypothesis. With the coefficient, however, there is a uniform
gradation with only the barest guideposts of weak, moderate and strong
relationships along the way. Actually, of course, we are still making a
decision, only it is a more complicated decision. Within the framework
of determinancy analysis we estimate the strength of the relationship
and then decide whether it is strong enough to warrant further
attention and inclusion in our theories.
But how Is this decision made? It should be clear that we can no
longer make a purely "statistical" decision abou t a relationship. Rather,
our decision must be based upon theoretical considerations. For
example, we might ask "what is the state of our theory in this area? " If
it is nil, that is if we know virtually nothing about what are important
determinants of social patterns in a particular area, then we should
want a rather high degree of determinancy so that the theory can really
be said to explain something. If the area is already well mapped,
however, then a relationship exhibiting a rather small determinancy will
be of considerable significance. Thus if we find a relationship which
accounts for 5 per cent of the variation in group anomie and we know
nothing about the determinants of anomie, we should not be very ready
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to get excited. If, on the other hand, we already can account for 80 per
cent of the variation in anomie, another 5 per cent is quite significant
and might lead to a vast modification of theory. At any rate the
. 'question of significance in a non-statistical sense becomes infinitely
more complicated within the framework suggested by this paper.
Certainly other objections will be forthcoming to this framework but
perhaps these two are of some importance. If so it may be fair for me
to stop anticipating the reactions of the community and to state my
own conclusions. They are that the coefficient of determinancy should
routinely accompany the use of tests of significance and that the
coefficient should be the chief criterion for determining whether the
data support any particular hypothesis. The maximal usefulness of the
coefficient is attendant upon the solution of several problems. First, a
general definition of the coefficient must be developed which applies to
the widest possible range of measurement and design. Unbiased
estimates of this coefficient must then be developed along with tests of
significance. Fortunately all of the elements of a solution to this
problem already exist. In fact the data in Table I are based upon these
unbiased estimates and the usual tests of significance apply unaltered.
Furthermore, the same computations are used to derive the results. The
only work that remains is to state the general definition and tie these
strands together. Second, the general definition alluded to above, while
capable of operational definition for both nominal and equal interval
scales, does not apply to ordinal scales. The parameters estimated in the
usual "non-parametric" tests of significance do not relate to the general
coefficient of determinancy. Consequently, either a new statistic must
~ invented or some other way must be invented to bring ordinal scales
Into the fold. I feel that this latter tack is the most fruitful. I would
argue that any ordinal scale can be transformed into a scale along which
an appropriate population will be normally distributed. This being the
case, all of the assumptions necessary for the use of parametric statistics
hoI? and they may be applied. In short, a future paper shall argue that
ordinal scales may be transformed so that they lose their obnoxious
properties.
The general definition ordinarily assumes that the variables are
measured without error. A number of techniques have been developed
which permit the correction for attenuation. It may be possible that
one reason for the low average determinancy in Table I of this paper
was a result of attenuation due to measurement error. If this is the case
this subject deserves concerted attention so that we may compensa~
for error and get a more just idea of the power of our theories.
There is one hitch to the above points: they apply only to the
relationships between two variables and a narrow range of multiple
vari~ble cases. In studies resulting from a careful experimental design,
unbiased estimates of the coefficient of determinancy are available
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regardless of the number of variables. However, in studies wherein
multiple correlation techniques are typically used, the situation is
almost hopeless. In this case, quite general in field and survey research
the strength of the relationships are hopelessly entangled with th;
strength of their interactions. This asymmetry between field and
experimental studies also deserves considerable attention. It raises a
rather serious question about the relationship between field and
.experimental research. At any rate, these problems must be tackled
before determinancy analysis can attain its full usefulness. The first
problem is solved; the second and third should not bevery difficult; the
fourth problem will probably require a good deal of work. The promise
of the method would seem to justify our attention.
TABLE I DETERMINANCY (Dx) of SIGNIFICANT RELATION-
SHIPS REPORTED IN ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN THE
FIRST THREE ISSUES OF THE AMERICAN SOCIO-
LOGICAL REVIEW of 1961.*
Original Statistic Nbof Nbof Dx Range in Dx % where
Studies Tests Low High Dx ).10
Chi-square 5 41 .083a .009 .250 34.1%
F-ratio 4 9 .159b .003 .578 66.7%
Correlation 2 49 .117c .001 .518 46.7%
All tests 12 99 .107 .001 .578 42.4%
*The data in the table are based on all articles reporting statistical
tests of significance which appeared in the February, April, and June
issues of the American Sociological Review. Due to its complicated
structure the analysis of variance reported in Anderson, T. R.· and
~geland, J. A. "Spatial Aspects of Social Area Analysis," was not
Included. In order to provide a somewhat firmer basis from which to
generalize the lone correlation study in this period was augmented by
the first non-demographic correlational study appearing prior to this
time: Martin, J. G. and Westie, F. R. "The Tolerant Personality,"
A.S.R.: 1959, (24 August), pp. 521-528. This addition balanced the
Seeman article in which the average r2 was .028 since its average was
.210. The overall average of about 12 per cent is probably not
unrepresentative of correlation studies in sociology. At any rate our
inclusion is biased opposite to our main argument.
a An unbiased estimate of the "coefficient of constraint" forms the
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basis for these figures. This is the ratio of uncertainty controlled by the
independent variable, termed "transmitted information" by Shannon,
to the uncertainty in the dependent variable, again measured by the
usual logarithmic information measure. T~is measure was chosen
because it is identical in structure and meaning to the other measures
used in this paper and applying it to normally distributed equal interval
scales would produce results identical to an analysis of variance. For
further information consult: McGill, W. J. "Isomorphism in Statistical
Analysis" and G. A. Miller, "Note on the Bias of Information
Measures," both in Quastler, H. (ed.) Information Theory in Psycho-
logy. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955; and also Senders, V.
Measurement and Statistics. N.Y.: The Oxford University Press, 1958,
pp.89-98.
b These figures are based on unbiased estimators of the variance in the
dependent variable attributable to the independent variable and to the
total variance of the dependent variable. These estimators were derived
from what is called "components of variance analysis." The percentages
are simply the ratio of these two terms. The best introduction to this
ratio is given by Haggard in his book on lntraclass Correlation and the
Analysis of Variance. N.Y.: The Dryden Press, 1958.
C These figures are based on biased estimators of the variance in the
dependent variable which is attributable to the independent variable
and the total variance in the dependent variable. The ratio of these
variances is given by the square of the correlation coefficient.
Unfortunately, unbiased estimates could not be derived from the
information made available in the articles. However, they may also be
derived from component of variance analysis. This is discussed in
Acton's book, Analysis of Straight Line Data. N.Y.: John Wiley and
Sons, 1959.
VERSTEHEN AND EXPLAN.~TION
Don Marquis
University of Kansas
The use of Verstehen in sociology has had a checkered history.
Indeed one might think that the "operation called Verstehen" had been
laid to rest twenty years ago by an oft-cited article of that title by
Theodore Abel. (1) Abel concludes that Verstehen has to do with
relating the behavior of others to "our personal experiences". (1, 685)
Accordingly:
Primarily the operation of Verstehen does two things: It relieves us
of a sense of apprehension in connection with behavior that is
unfamiliar or unexpected and it is a source of "hunches" which can
help us in the formulation of hypotheses. (1, 687) ,
Professor Ernest Nagel, at the conclusion of a discussion of "meaning-
ful" explanations of human behavior, concludes that:
TABLE II THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK AND STATIS-
TICAL DETERMINANCY FOR RELATIONSHIPS SIGNI-
FICANT BEYOND THE 5 PER CENT LEVEL.
Null hypothesis
rejected at
Percent Determinancy
N
5%
.15,4
41
2%
.07,0
10
78
1%
.03,9
29
.1%
.13,3
19
Total
.10,7
99
(The social scientist's) ability tu enter into relations of empathy with
the human actors in some social process may indeed be heuristically
important in his efforts to invent suitable hypotheses which will
explain the process. Nevertheless, his empathetic identification with
these individuals does not, by itself, constitute knowledge. (2, 484)
~ofessor Murr~y Wax has defended the use of Verstehen in sociology
In a recent artlcle, Wax argues that Abel's criticisms are misguided
because Abel has misunderstood what Verstehen is. According to Wax:
Following the the~retical lead of Weber (cited above), he (Abel)
places the emphasis (of Verstehen) upon the imputation of motive
which, and here he is quite correct, he sees as a difficulty in this kind
of case, but he misses the point that the true level of Verstehen
involved here is far deeper and more primitive. (3, 326)
Not only does the "real" Verstehen not involve imputation of motive
but, according to Wax, it also does not involve "interpersonai
